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1. INTRODUCTION
In late 2001 the outbreak of a serious eco-
nomic, social and political crisis in Argentina 
brought its exchange rate convertibility to an 
end. This exchange rate regime, based on the 
parity of the peso with the dollar, was pivotal in 
eliminating hyperinflation and was the corner-
stone of Argentine economic policies during the 
nineties, the first half of which were marked by 
a prolonged and sharp economic expansion.
This apparent success meant that, during 
the nineties, the Argentine experience was seen 
as a model for other emerging economies. But 
underlying this process were deep-seated prob-
lems that remained masked during the upturn. 
The constraints imposed by a fixed exchange 
rate were not accompanied either by sufficient 
headway in terms of reforms, which would have 
given the economy the flexibility it needed, or by 
true fiscal discipline. When a series of adverse 
external disturbances affected the emerging 
countries and the fiscal position began visibly to 
deteriorate, under the weight of insufficiently 
rigorous policies, the economy’s expansionary 
cycle petered out towards 1998. Difficulties then 
began to build up and the loss of competitive-
ness associated with exchange rate parity and 
with the strength of the dollar made itself felt, 
particularly following the devaluation of the Bra-
zilian real in 1999. Thereafter, the economy 
went into recession and the vulnerability of the 
fiscal position became a cause for alarm. Grad-
ually, a scenario took shape in which a crisis 
was as inevitable as it was difficult to manage, 
as is usually the case in highly dollarised econ-
omies. The crash was disorderly and accompa-
nied by a grave political and social crisis. This 
bore on the subsequent management of the 
crisis, in which a series of measures were taken 
that involved the abandonment of the legal and 
economic framework in place: the suspension 
of payments on sovereign debt; banking, foreign 
exchange and capital restrictions; the asymmet-
rical conversion into pesos of bank balance 
sheets, and price controls.
The first part of this article describes how 
the crisis unfolded during the course of 2002, 
taking us to the present time when, after a deep 
slump and several months of stabilisation, a re-
covery seems to be under way in the economy. 
Nonetheless, the economy continues to operate 
under heavy financial, foreign exchange, price 
and legal restrictions, and against a backdrop of 
heightened legal and institutional uncertainty, 
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which is exacerbated by the fact that elections 
are due this year. In the near term, Argentina 
faces the difficult challenge of bringing its eco-
nomic environment on to a normal footing and 
of entrenching the precarious stability attained 
to date so that the incipient economic recovery 
may be firmly and sustainably underpinned. The 
main elements of this complex task are re-
viewed in the second part of the article.
2.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
IN ARGENTINA DURING 2002
The cumulative decline in GDP forecast for 
2002 is around 11%. If the four previous years 
of recession are added, GDP will have fallen by 
23% since early 1998 (see Chart 1), meaning it 
has reverted to 1993 levels. Meantime, poverty 
indices have reached unprecedented levels. 
This economic depression is only comparable in 
recent history to that which the formerly cen-
trally planified economies of Central Europe un-
derwent in the early nineties.
The key factor behind the deepening of the 
crisis in 2002 was the growing expectation sur-
rounding the unsustainability of the convertibility 
regime in the closing months of 2001, and its 
subsequent abandonment in early 2002, which 
had an immediate impact on monetary and ex-
change rate developments. The devaluation and 
subsequent float was accompanied by a seri-
ous loss of savers’ confidence in their currency, 
which prompted a flight towards the dollar and a 
swifter exchange rate depreciation. The peso 
tumbled from parity with the dollar, at end-2001, 
to a rate of four pesos per dollar in April 2002 
(see Chart 2). Given the deep-seated dollarisa-
tion of the economy, there was a risk of entering 
into a vicious circle in which depreciation would 
increase inflation expectations, and these, in 
turn, would ratchet up pressures on the curren-
cy. In parallel, the central government and the 
provinces, beleaguered by the deterioration of 
their fiscal position, proliferated the issuance of 
public securities as a means of payment (quasi-
currencies). This aroused fears of an inflation-
exchange rate spiral being activated and the re-
turn of hyperinflation. Monthly inflation rates ran 
into two digits in April. Since August, however, 
the stability of the monetary and exchange-rate 
variables has been notable, as can be seen in 
Chart 2, thereby averting an uncontrollable in-
flation spiral and placing the annual inflation 
rate at the end of 2002 at 41%, a substantially 
lower rate than forecast some quarters back. 
The exchange rate held at around 3.60-3.70 
pesos against the dollar during the second half 
of the year and the reaction of the foreign ex-
change market to adverse shocks - the Brazil-
ian pre-electoral crisis or the Argentine govern-
ment’s default vis-à-vis the World Bank - was 
very limited. With these disturbances behind the 
peso has moved onto an appreciating path, tak-
ing it to around 3.2 pesos per dollar in recent 
months. That has allowed a partial but swift eas-
ing of the restrictions in place on the foreign ex-
change market, especially those affecting cur-
rent transactions.
The stabilisation of the exchange rate and of 
prices has been based on various factors. First-
ly, the authorities have established a complex 
system of restrictions of the monetary and for-
eign exchange markets. The controls on the 
purchase, settlement and sale of currency have 
limited capital flight, and the financial and bank-
ing restrictions have brought the money-crea-
tion process to a halt; moreover, the drastic ex-
ternal adjustment, along with the suspension of 
payments, has allowed the stock of foreign re-
serves to stabilise (see Chart 2). In this way, the 
central bank has been able to regulate effec-
tively the supply of dollars, to temper the drain-
ing off of liquidity from the system and, indeed, 
to initiate the regulation of the money stock via 
monetary instruments (this is in its early stag-
es). The counterpoint to these restrictions is 
that, in all likelihood, the decline in activity has 
been deepened and the allocation of resources 
distorted, since financial flows in the economy 
have been hindered and agents’ confidence 
dented.
There have been other relevant factors in the 
containment of financial indicators. First, the 
suspension of payments on foreign sovereign 
debt (which has subsequently and temporarily 
eased the financial burden on federal govern-
ment, until restructuring is resolved) and the fa-
vourable effect of inflation on tax revenue and 
public finances, both of which factors have re-
duced pressures to monetise budget deficits. 
Next, the administrative regulation of a wide 
range of prices (especially government-set 
rates) and the control of wages (imposed in the 
case of the public sector and concerted in that 
of the private sector), which has in many cases 
enabled indexation processes to be unwound. 
Finally, the high level of unemployment and de-
pressed domestic demand have exerted a re-
straining influence on nominal wage rises 
(which have been virtually zero), prompting a 
heavy fall in real wages and mitigating the gen-
eralised increases in prices, despite the pesoifi-
cation of the economy.
Amid the confidence crisis besetting the 
country in late 2001, the Argentine financial 
system experienced massive withdrawals of 
funds (see Chart 2). The withdrawal restrictions 
on deposits, known as the “corralito” (sight de-
posits) and the “corralón” (term deposits), were 
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imposed in order to avoid a run on banks. But 
they have seriously weakened banks’ relations 
with their clients and distorted activity in this 
sector, since the intermediation of funds be-
tween loans and deposits has been seriously 
hampered. The suspension of payments de-
creed at Christmas in 2001 generated very high 
losses at financial institutions, whose exposure 
to the public sector had increased notably ow-
ing to the major role they had played in financ-
ing the deficit during the pre-crisis period. Final-
ly, the abandonment of convertibility and the 
asymmetrical pesoification of deposits and 
loans unbalanced bank balance sheets (1). 
Moreover, last year the deposits withheld by the 
banking system were continuously depleted fur-
ther by the so-called “amparos” (legal injunc-
tions), which allowed savers to retrieve their 
funds in the original currency, giving rise to sub-
stantial costs for banks and obliging them to re-
sort to rediscounting facilities from the Argen-
tine central bank.
As from the summer the decline in deposits 
has been checked thanks to the stability of the 
exchange rate and of inflation. The high interest 
rates offered by banks, along with the capital 
flight restrictions, have attracted fresh funds 
from savers. This return of deposits has made 
for a certain improvement in banks’ liquidity. 
Against this background, the decision to remove 
the restrictions on sight deposits and some of 
those on term deposits has not prompted ap-
preciably adverse affects, and many banks have 
even decided to allow fixed-term fund withdraw-
als for amounts above those regulated. This 
shows that some headway may be made, with 
caution, towards financial normalisation, al-
though a high degree of uncertainty remains 
concerning ongoing legal processes, the impact 
of the normalisation of banking activity and the 
future restructuring of the sector.
As indicated in the introduction, the lack of 
fiscal discipline at both the federal and provin-
cial levels was one of the explanatory factors of 
the crisis. Since the summer Argentine public fi-
nances have trended relatively favourably, but 
underlying this positive development are two 
conjunctural factors: the effect of inflation, which 
has boosted revenues on existing taxes, and 
the introduction of high withholdings on exports. 
In combination, these two factors mean that tax 
revenue has, in nominal terms, exceeded pre-
crisis levels, while public spending has held 
stable. As a result, there was a federal govern-
ment primary surplus of 0.8% of GDP in 2002. It 
should be recalled, however, that the suspen-
sion of payments on debt has clearly eased the 
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(1) To be precise, most of the exposure to the public 
sector was in the form of guaranteed loans (the outcome of 
the conversion of debt in 2001). But following their pesoifi-
cation, the terms of these loans became drastically less fa-
vourable for banks.
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borrowing to be reduced from 18% to 6% of 
GDP.
As Chart 3 shows, however, several factors 
have almost tripled the federal debt/GDP ratio. 
First, the drastic exchange rate depreciation 
(which has raised the value of foreign debt in 
terms of domestic currency) has been only 
partly offset by the effect of inflation on nominal 
GDP, such that the combined impact of this ad-
justment of relative prices on debt is estimated 
at 85 points of GDP. In addition, the heavy fall in 
GDP has added a further 16 points to the ratio. 
The pesoification of guaranteed loans (at 1.4 
pesos per dollar) has not sufficed to counter 
these effects, despite entailing a reduction of 
almost 40 points of GDP in the stock of debt. 
Lastly, the build-up in arrears, the issuance of 
new securities (including those arising from the 
conversion of deposits and the compensation to 
banks for the asymmetrical pesoification), the 
takeover of provincial debt and other lesser 
items have added a further 25 points, making 
for an estimated ratio of 137% at end-2002.
The provinces’ borrowing requirements were 
eased at the start of the year by the issuance of 
bonds as a means of payment for services and 
their use as quasi-currencies. In recent months, 
and despite the serious underlying imbalances, 
provincial financial problems have become a sec-
ondary concern owing to the above-mentioned 
rise in revenue (which has allowed transfers to the 
provinces to be increased) and to the containment 
of expenditure at the provincial level.
This economic and financial setting has had 
a far-reaching impact on activity, which declined 
at a rate of 16.3% in 2002 Q1 compared with 
the same period a year earlier. The only positive 
contribution to GDP has been that of the exter-
nal sector, whose surplus grew notably, though 
this was due more to the halving of imports than 
to the increase in exports, owing in part to the 
shortage of credit and to the high withholdings 
taxing exports. The trade surplus thus almost 
tripled last year, rising to over USD 16 billion.
However, as from Q3 the indicators of activi-
ty have stabilised, and they have begun a re-
covery which has been gaining momentum in 
recent months, thanks to their low starting point, 
to surplus capacity and to the strong adjustment 
of real wages.
3.  OUTLOOK AND CHALLENGES
FOR 2003
Argentina has moved into 2003 on a more 
stable footing than a year back. But it should be 
borne in mind that such stability is based on 
exceptional arrangements, replete with adminis-
trative restrictions and other non-permanent 
factors such as the suspension of payments on 
foreign debt in private hands, the favourable im-
pact of inflation on public finances and the posi-
tive effect of the depreciation on the trade bal-
ance. The work ahead in the coming years will 
be complex, since the economic system must 
be brought onto a normal footing, stability must 
be consolidated and, moreover, progress on the 
numerous reforms put off during the convertibil-
ity regime must be furthered, as the failure to 
see these through played a determinant role in 
the crisis. Without reform the Argentine econo-
�������� ����� ��� ����� �� �������
��� ������� ���� ���� ������ ��������� ��� �������� ����� ����� ������ ���� ������� ��� ������������� ������� ������� ������ ���� ������ ������
���� ��� � ���� �� ���� ������������














��������� ������������� ���� ������� ��� ���� ���������� ���� ���
�����



























THE ARGENTINE CRISIS A YEAR ON
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / APRIL 20034
THE ARGENTINE CRISIS A YEAR ON
BANCO DE ESPAÑA / ECONOMIC BULLETIN / APRIL 2003 5
my might show moderate growth rates in the 
short run, but its structural weaknesses would 
once again soon become manifest, thereby lim-
iting potential and actual growth capacity and 
prolonging excessively the effects of the crisis 
on income levels in the country (2).
According to the analyses of international fi-
nancial agencies, a successful strategy for Ar-
gentina to emerge from the crisis in the coming 
quarters will hinge on four aspects: the resump-
tion of international financing, monetary and fi-
nancial normalisation, banking regulation and 
restructuring, and the redressing of public fi-
nances.
In the current circumstances, with most eco-
nomic sectors affected by the crisis, and given 
the public sector’s high borrowing requirements 
(these being largely latent at present owing to 
the suspension of payments situation) and the 
lack of domestic resources to kick-start the 
business sector, Argentina depends on interna-
tional capital inflows to finance its economic de-
velopment. However, bringing about the return 
of international financing will not be easy owing 
to the widespread breakdown in property rights 
in the past year and to the suspension of pay-
ments on foreign public debt.
Foreign financing may be forthcoming 
through three channels: foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), financing from multilateral agencies 
and the international loans and debt market.
Although FDI flows have been negative in 
net terms in the past two years, their behaviour 
has been better than expected. Despite eco-
nomic depression and legal and institutional 
uncertainty, a substantial portion of foreign in-
vestment has remained in the country. FDI flows 
are highly unlikely to increase substantially in 
the future; but it should be stressed that, given 
the cumulative depreciation, costs in Argentine 
industry are at present very low and Argentine 
assets are priced more favourably. If the reforms 
pending are tackled appropriately, investment in 
Argentina could once again become attractive 
in the medium term.
Financing flows from multilateral agencies 
have been important for Argentina in recent 
years. However, following the IMF arrangement 
in September 2001, Argentina’s negotiations 
with international financial institutions entered a 
difficult period. Despite this a transitional accord 
has recently been reached with the IMF, which 
has confined itself to refinancing outstanding 
debts until August this year (USD 6.78 billion), 
helping maintain stability during the electoral 
period. This agreement also includes several 
measures (mentioned in the following pages) 
that will allow the economy to move towards 
normalisation. After the change of government, 
it is expected that the country will negotiate a 
more ambitious programme, encompassing far-
reaching reforms that will include those side-
lined during the decade of convertibility.
Finally, access to international debt markets 
will continue to be blocked for the public sector for 
some time after the suspension of payments on 
sovereign debt has been lifted. That underscores 
how pressing it is to initiate steps for the restruc-
turing of foreign debt, as mentioned in the transi-
tional agreement. The financing possibilities for 
the private sector also hinge largely on the suc-
cessful outcome of this process. The current scale 
of debt indicates that negotiations will be compli-
cated, since the proportion of debt haircut needed 
to restore fiscal sustainability might be high.
As has been the case in recent months, and 
as the pick-up in economic activity and confi-
dence progressively firms, the authorities will 
foreseeably push through the appropriate meas-
ures for the orderly lifting of the restrictions still 
in place on the functioning of the banking sys-
tem and foreign exchange controls (which have 
largely contributed to the stabilisation of finan-
cial indicators), and bring about monetary and 
financial normalisation.
Pivotal to this process is the anchoring of in-
flationary expectations by means of a coherent 
monetary strategy. Initially, the Argentine central 
bank has opted for a system of monitoring mon-
etary aggregates. In the medium term, there is 
a risk that the prospect of a strong increase in 
liquidity further to the release of deposits frozen 
under the “corralito” and “corralón”, along with 
an increase in domestic demand, may generate 
price pressures. Another aspect of normalisa-
tion which might prompt inflationary pressures 
is the liberalisation of prices in the economy, in 
particular public utilities’ regulated rates, which 
have been artificially contained to date. Against 
a background of recovering demand, the liber-
alisation of wages may also have adverse ef-
fects on prices. Therefore, the new agreement 
with the IMF covers the need to contain the 
growth of base money, without prejudice to the 
future consideration of moving, as appears to 
be the authorities’ intention, to a direct inflation 
targeting framework.
Monetary and financial normalisation will not 
be feasible unless there is a deep-seated re-
(2) See Chart 1. If the economy’s growth potential held 
at 4%, pre-crisis income levels would be recovered by 2007. 
But if growth potential were limited to 2%, such levels would 
not be attained until 2012, meaning a new decade would be 
lost.
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structuring of the banking system. The initial 
objectives of such restructuring will, under the 
programme agreed upon with the IMF, involve a 
far-reaching review of banking regulations and 
supervision, and the safeguarding of creditors’ 
rights.
Here, most analysts believe the structure of 
the Argentine banking system should be recon-
sidered, evaluating bank solvency and analys-
ing the possibilities of reorganisation in the most 
delicate instances, with the strict application of 
the fairness principle across the various seg-
ments of the banking system.
The role of the central bank in this area will 
prove fundamental. As indicated in the transi-
tional programme, the central bank will, in de-
signing and implementing a policy of monetary 
rigour, and as lender of last resort, require 
greater autonomy in respect of the executive 
branch and, as regards the second function, a 
clarification of the conditions in which financial 
assistance should be granted.
The redressing of public finances, which was 
not satisfactorily tackled during the nineties and 
whose structural limitations were among the 
basic reasons for the crisis, rests on two pillars: 
the reorganisation of public spending and the 
reformulation of the nation/provinces relation-
ship. Given future financing requirements, there 
will evidently be a need to sustain considerable 
primary surpluses, as stated in the transitional 
programme (2.5% of GDP for 2003), even in the 
event of favourable terms for the restructuring of 
foreign debt. These surpluses cannot be sus-
tained, as has been the case in 2002, on the 
basis of inflation effects or distortionary taxes 
such as the withholdings on exports.
In the fiscal realm, there is still much room 
for improving the effectiveness of the tax sys-
tem, and the transitional programme has set 
out the need to broaden the tax base, combat-
ing evasion in particular. Turning to expendi-
ture, reforms are required to modernise and 
increase the effectiveness of the public sector. 
Moreover, the reforms should in the future con-
sider a revision of social welfare arrangements, 
since the crisis has affected most adversely 
the assets of private pension funds, which had 
been bolstered over the past decade. Finally, 
as concerns tax relations with the provinces, 
certain institutional particularities have acted 
as an obstacle, even during the boom years, to 
the rationalisation of transfer arrangements. 
The provinces have tended to weaken fiscal 
discipline, as their agreements with govern-
ment have often not been complied with. The 
reform of these relations is already included in 
the transitional programme and it would be 
aimed at establishing the principle of fiscal co-
responsibility.
4. CONCLUSIONS
This article has reviewed developments in 
the Argentine economy over the past year, ana-
lysing the aspects that should prove most im-
portant in the near future.
It first describes how the economy has 
managed to stabilise thanks to a mix of non-or-
thodox restrictive measures: a freeze on depos-
its, foreign exchange and price controls, distor-
tionary taxes, etc. These restrictions may have 
contributed to preventing hyperinflation, but 
their cost has been high in terms of activity and 
they have caused, in certain cases, the infringe-
ment of property rights and a serious loss of 
confidence. Moreover, it should not be forgotten 
that the current recovery is departing from par-
ticularly depressed levels of activity, and that 
the array of restrictions on the normal function-
ing of the economy acts as a brake on the firm-
ing of the recovery, whereby their progressive 
elimination is a priority. Nonetheless, this proc-
ess should be conducted with caution, as a deli-
cate balance must be struck between the need 
for normalisation and the pressures that such 
normalisation may bring to bear on prices, wag-
es and the financial solvency of certain sectors.
From a more structural perspective, the de-
pendence on foreign capital to resume a path of 
sustainable growth and the subsequent need to 
gradually restore domestic and foreign inves-
tors’ confidence calls for resolute action to re-
direct economic policies. That inevitably involves 
economic discipline and, above all, a fresh 
process of reforms, many of which were not 
tackled during the years of expansion. The effi-
ciency of the economy will ultimately hinge on 
this. In any event, a high degree of consensus 
will be required along with courageous and res-
olute policy action on the part of the authorities. 
While initial sacrifices will be inevitable, it is only 
this way that a path of sustained growth can be 
pursued, helping to restore the income levels of 
the nineties within a reasonable time and to pre-
vent the risk of the current recovery petering out 
in the medium term.
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